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INTRODUCTION
AStarlight, starbright, first star I see tonight, I wish I 
may, I wish I might, have the wish I wish tonight.@ How many 
times have we heard or used that childhood refrain during our 
lifetime? We use such words even though we know that wishing 
won=t make things come true. Those Awish@ words are what the law 
characterizes as precatory words - words that convey a 
recommendation rather than a positive command or direction. We 
often see them used in wills to express a settlor=s intent to 
create a trust, sometimes being interpreted to impose an 
obligation on those to whom they are directed - and sometimes 
not. This article includes a history of the courts=
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2interpretations of those expressions and asks whether there is 
any bright line test in analyzing the settlor=s intent to create 
a trust when precatory words or expressions are used.
I BACKGROUND
AA trust is, generally speaking, a device whereby a trustee 
manages property as a fiduciary for one or more beneficiaries. 
The trustee holds legal title to the property.... The 
beneficiaries hold equitable title....@2 The settlor, the one who 
creates the trust, need only manifest an intent (by words or 
conduct) that the property (the Ares@) be held in trust for the 
beneficiary (the Acestui que trust@) for some purpose.
Nothing more than a manifestation of intent to create a 
trust is necessary.3 The United States Supreme Court has held, 
ANo technical language is necessary to the creation of a 
trust.... If it appears to be the intention of the parties from 
the whole instrument creating it that the property conveyed is to 
be held or dealt with for the benefit of another, a court of 
2 Wills, Trusts, and Estates, Dukeminier, Johanson, 
Lindgren & Sitkoff, 7th Ed., Aspen Publishers, 2005, p. 485.
3 Scott, The Law of Trusts (4th Ed., 1987) ' 17.1, except 
for trusts of real estate for which a writing is required under 
the Statute of Frauds or where the disposition is testamentary 
and must comply with the applicable Statute of Wills. Not even a 
transfer of property is required since the owner may declare 
himself a trustee of his property for others. Id. ' 17.1. See 
also Restatement (Third) of Trusts ' 13 (2003): AA trust is 
created only if the settlor properly manifests an intention to 
create a trust relationship.@
3equity will affix to it the character of a trust....@4 Thus, 
where a person=s intent is to separate legal ownership from 
equitable ownership, a valid trust comes into existence.5
It is precisely because the formality of creating a trust is 
so informal that so much uncertainty has arisen where persons 
attempt that creation without a writing. But lack of a writing is 
really not the issue; it=s the language used, whether or not it=s 
written.6
In the normal course of events, the manifested intent of the 
4 Colton v. Colton 127 U.S. 300, 310 (1887)
5 Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, ' 1 (2d Ed. 
1979); see also Penny v. White, 594 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. App. 1980) 
where, at p. 639, the court states AA valid express trust comes 
into existence when a person with a present power of disposition 
over definable property reposes the legal ownership to that res 
in another for the beneficial use of a third person.@ It must 
also be remembered that the mere use of the words Atrust@ or 
Atrustee@ does not, ipso facto, create a trust. Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts '13, comment b (2003); Bogert, The Law of 
Trusts and Trustees, ' 11 (6th Ed. 1987) 
6 The issue of whether a Aprecatory trust@ is created may 
arise not only in a testamentary disposition, but also in other 
instruments: a deed to the Vestry and Wardens of a parish Afor 
the purpose of aiding in the establishment of a Home for Indigent 
Widows or Orphans@ was expressive of motive and given the same 
interpretation as being precatory, St. James Parish v. Bagley, 50 
S.E. 841 (N.C. 1905); see also Marx v. Rice, 65 A.2d 48 (N.J. 
1949) where the precatory words were held not to create a 
mandatory duty upon a holder of a power of appointment. And in 
TAM 9722001, the settlor was Adesirous@ that the trustee 
distribute the trust principal in accordance with the 
beneficiary=s wishes. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that the 
precatory language did not give the beneficiary a power of 
appointment.
4settlor is clearly expressed in a document - either in an inter-
vivos instrument or in a testamentary document. Yet even though 
the intent may be expressly stated, the trust may still fail for 
lack of a trust res,7 a lack of identifiable beneficiaries,8 or 
because the equitable duties imposed upon the trustee are too 
vague to be enforced.9
This intent must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.10
If the language in the will plainly and unambiguously expresses 
7 In Brainerd v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 
1937), the taxpayer orally declared a trust of his expected 
profits from stock trading during the following year. Although 
there was an express declaration of trust intent, the court held 
that there was no res at the time of the declaration and the 
trust failed because there was no additional declaration when the 
profits came into existence. The trust failed for want of a res. 
8 In Clark v. Campbell, 133 A. 166 (N.H. 1926), the 
testator declared a trust of his property not distributed during 
his lifetime and directed the trustees to distribute the same Ato 
such of my friends and they, my trustees, shall select.@ The 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire held at p. 168 that ABy the common 
law there cannot be a valid bequest to an indefinite person. 
There must be a beneficiary or a class of beneficiaries indicated 
in the will capable of coming into court and claiming the benefit 
of the bequest.@ Thus, although there was a clear expression to 
create a trust, it failed for a lack of definite beneficiaries.
9 Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. Jr. 399, 406, 32 
Eng. Rept. 656, 659: ABut here there is no specific purpose 
pointed out, to which the residue is to be applied....@ Scott, 
The Law of Trusts (4th Ed. 1987), ' 123(3); Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts ' 13, comments a, d (2003) 
10 Matter of Bollinger, 943 P.2d 981 (Mont. 1997): 
A...evidence which is unmistakable, clear, satisfactory and 
convincing.@; see also, Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, ' 49, (2nd 
Rev. Ed., 1982)
5the intention of the testator, extrinsic evidence is not 
admissible to show an intention different from that expressed in 
the will.11 But extrinsic evidence of surrounding facts and 
circumstances may be admitted to explain the language of a will 
when uncertainty arises as to the testator=s true intention.12
What happens when a trust fails? In Briggs v. Penny,13 it is 
declared: AIf a testator gives upon trust, though he never adds a 
syllable to denote the objects of that trust, or though he 
declares the trust in such a way as not to exhaust the property, 
or though he declares it imperfectly, or though the trusts are 
illegal, still in all these cases, as is well known, the legatee 
is excluded, and the next of kin take.@ In other words, the trust 
fails and there is a resulting trust back to the next of kin.
II WHAT ARE PRECATORY WORDS?
PRECATORY is defined as Ahaving the nature of prayer, 
request, or entreaty; conveying or embodying a recommendation or 
advice or the expression of a wish, but not a positive command or 
direction.@14
PRECATORY WORDS are AWords of entreaty, request, desire, 
11 Woodcock v. McCord, 295 P.2d 734 (Wash. 1931)
12 In re Estate of Curry, 988 P.2d 505 (Wash.App. 1995)
13 3 Mac. & G. 546, 42 Eng. Rept. 371, 375 (1851)
14 Black=s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., West Publishing Co., 
1990
6wish, or recommendation, employed in wills, as distinguished from 
direct and imperative terms.@15
Professor Bogert expresses it as follows:
The words Arequest,@ Adesire,@ and the like, do 
not naturally import to most persons a legal 
obligation....but that such an obligation may 
be shown by other portions of the instrument 
or by extrinsic evidence.16
PRECATORY TRUST is AA trust created by certain words, which 
are more like words of entreaty and permission than of command or 
certainty. Examples of such words, which the courts have held 
sufficient to constitute a trust, are >wish and request,= >have 
fullest confidence,= >heartily beseech,= and the like.@17
Labeling a trust as Aprecatory@ is misleading. For if the 
words indicating intent are merely precatory rather than 
directional or imperative, a trust is not created. Where the 
words are directional or imperative, a trust is created. AIf 
there be a trust sufficiently expressed and capable of 
enforcement by a court of equity, it does not disparage, much 
less defeat it, to call it a precatory trust.@18 AThe conflict of 
opinion as to the effect of words of this character is almost 
15 Id.
16 Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, (Rev. 2nd Ed. 
1984)
17 Black=s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, West Publishing 
Co., 1990
18 Supra, footnote 3, at 312
7bewildering.@19 In the strictest sense, a precatory Atrust@ is an 
oxymoron but courts have adopted this expression to apply to the 
implied trust created by precatory words or expressions.
It is not required that the settlor realize that he is 
creating a trust.20 It is a question of law for the court to 
decide.21 The obvious question then is what is the intent being 
manifested by the >settlor= by his use of precatory words.22
In making the determination AAccount should be taken of the 
relative situations of the parties, the ties of affection 
subsisting between them, and the motives which would naturally 
influence the mind of the testator, as well as the existence of a 
moral duty on his part toward the party who will benefit from 
compliance with his desires and recommendations.@23 A... [T]he use 
of the precatory words... must be given the effect the testator 
intended them to have.@24 In other words, all the facts and 
19 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 42 N.E. 465, 467 (Ind. 1895)
20 Where the owner of bearer bonds delivers then to X and 
tells X to sell them and deliver the proceeds to B, X holds the 
bonds in trust for B. Restatement (Third) of Trusts, ' 13, 
comment a (2003), Illustration 2.
21 Matter of Bollinger, 943 P.2d 981 (Mont. 1997)
22 i.e., A...what is the meaning of the language used...,@
Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, 127 N.W. 673, 674 (Mich. 1910): a 
bequest to the owner of a sanitarium "to be used as he sees best 
for carrying on the work of relieving suffering" did not create a 
precatory trust.
23 Cumming v. Pendleton, 153 A. 175, 177 (Conn. 1931)
24 Lewis v. Atkins, 105 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ind. 1952). See 
8circumstances are to be taken into account.25 It is therefore seen 
that the same word, e.g., Awish,@ may give rise to a trust in one 
circumstance but not in another26 because @Precedents are of 
little value in matters involving the construction of wills.@27
In re Estate of Curry, 988 P2d 505 (Wash.App. 1999) which applied 
the seven criteria of Restatement (Second) of Trusts ' 25, 
comment b (1959) to find a trust by the use of the words AI 
trust@ the devisee will give an equal share to the other 
children. See also Penny v. White, supra, footnote 4.
25 Restatement (Third) of Trusts ' 13 comment d (2003) 
states the factors to be considered:
(1) the specific terms and overall tenor of 
the words used; (2) the definiteness or 
indefiniteness of the property involved; (3) 
the ease or difficulty of ascertaining 
possible trust purposes and terms, and the 
specificity or vagueness of the possible 
beneficiaries and their interests; (4) the 
interests or motives and the nature and 
degree of concerns that may reasonably be 
supposed to have influenced the transferor; 
(5) the financial situation, dependencies, 
and expectations of the parties; (6) the 
transferor=s prior conduct, statements, and 
relationships with respect to possible trust 
beneficiaries; (7) the personal and any 
fiduciary relationships between the 
transferor and the transferee; (8) other 
dispositions the transferor is making or has 
made of his or her wealth; and (9) whether 
the result of construing the disposition as 
involving a trust or not would be such as a 
person in the situation of the transferor 
would be likely to desire.
26 AThe use of precatory words in a given will may be 
sufficient to create a precatory trust whereas the same words in 
another will may not.@ Centerre Trust Company of St. Louis v. The 
United States of America, 676 F.Supp. 928, 934 (U.S.D.C., E.D. 
Mo. 1988) 
27 In re Hellman=s Estate, 266 N.W. 36, 38 (Iowa 1936)
III HISTORY
9A Pennsylvania case traces the origin of precatory trusts to 
Roman law:
It was part of the Roman law that the devisee 
or legatee, accepting the estate of a 
decedent, became at once personally charged 
with the payment of all his debts, whether 
the estate was sufficient to discharge them 
or not; and by way of compensation it was 
made discretionary with him to pay any of the 
legacies bequeathed by the testator. Hence, 
when all such bequests could be thus defeated 
at the pleasure of the devisee or legatee, 
there was no alternative left to the testator 
but to incorporate in his will an appeal to 
the devisee or legatee to make the desired 
disposition. Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. St. 
268. The hardship of this law finally 
compelled the courts to declare that words of 
recommendation, request, entreaty, wish, or 
explanation, addressed to the devisee or 
legatee, will make him a trustee for the 
person or persons in whose favor such 
expressions are used, (1 Jarm. Wills, 385;) 
whence precatory trusts.28
The early view was that precatory words were mandatory. In 
the 1704 case of Eeles v. England,29 the devise was of ,300 Amy 
will and desire is, that he will give the said ,300 unto his 
daughter Susan at the time of his death or sooner....@ The equity 
court held that the words AI desire, or I will, in a will amount 
unto an express devise.@30
This view continued in Harding v. Glyn.31 There the 
28 Board of Foreign Missions of United Presbyterian Church 
v. Culp, 25 A. 117, 118 (Pa. 1892).
29 2 Vern. 467, 23 Eng. Rept. 901 (1704); see also Forbes 
v. Ball, 3 Mer. 437, 36 Eng. Rept. 168 (1817)
30 Id. at 901.
31 1 Atk. 489, 26 Eng. Rept. 299 (1739)
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testator=s will gave a house and belongings to his wife Abut did 
desire her at or before her death to give@ such estate among his 
own deserving relations. She bequeathed the property to others. 
The court found two issues. First, whether the wife was intended 
to take only a beneficial interest and second, if so, who was to 
take after her death. As to the first issue, the court found A... 
it is clear the wife was intended to take only beneficially 
during her life...and the words willing or desiring have been 
frequently construed to amount to a trust....@ However, because 
there was doubt as who was to take after her, the court awarded 
the property to the husband=s next of kin. 
In Brown v. Higgs,32 the testator Aauthorized and empowered@
his nephew to receive excess rents from certain real estate and 
Ato employ@ that excess to children of other nephews as he shall 
think most deserving. The court held that a trust was created. In 
affirming the decision,33 the court said that by using the term 
Ato employ,@ he is clearly made a trustee.34
Again, in Cruwyn v. Colman,35 the bequest was to the 
testator=s sister, also the executrix, adding that A... it is my 
absolute desire that [she]... bequeaths at her own death to those 
32 Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. Jun. 708 (1799)
33 5 Ves. Jun. 495 (1800)
34 Id. at 506
35 9 Ves. Jun. 319, 37 Eng. Rept. 626 (1804)
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of her own family what she has in her own power to dispose of, 
that was mine....@ The court, Sir William Grant, without 
discussion said, AThere is no doubt, that in this instance the 
words are sufficiently certain to raise a trust.@36
Weeks after the Cruwyn case, Sir Grant decided the case of
Morice v. The Bishop of Durham.37 There the bequest was to the 
Bishop Ato dispose of the ultimate residue to such objects of 
benevolence and liberality as [he] in his own discretion shall 
most approve of....@ Although there was a trust, the court said 
it failed for want of certainty of an object.38
In Wright v. Atkyns,39 the devise was of all real estate to 
the testator=s mother (he, the son, being unmarried) Aand her 
heirs forever, in the fullest confidence that after her decease 
36 Id. at 323
37 9 Ves. Jun. 399, 32 Eng. Rept. 656 (1804), affirmed at 
10 Ves. Jun. 522, 32 Eng. Rept. 947 (1805) by Lord Chancellor 
Eldon; also cited in Knight v. Knight, infra, footnote 46.
38 In affirming on appeal, Lord Chancellor Eldon said at 
p. 952: APrima facie an absolute interest was given; and the 
question was, whether precatory, not mandatory, words imposed a 
trust upon that person; and the Court has said , before these 
words or request or accommodation create a trust, it must be 
shewn [sic], that the object and the subject are certain; and it 
is not immaterial to this case, that it must be shewn [sic], that 
the objects are certain. If neither the objects nor the subject 
are certain, then the recommendation or request does not create a 
trust .... Where the subject ... and objects are to be found in a 
Will not expressly creating a trust, [the indefinite subject and 
objects] are always used by the Court as Evidence that the mind 
of the testator was not to create a trust.@
39 Turn. & R. 156, 37 Eng. Rept. 1051 (1823)
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she will devise the property to my family....@ Lord Chancellor 
Eldon held that the words were imperative.40
This view prevailed in the United States as well. In Ingram 
v. Fraley,41 the testator gave his entire estate to his friend, 
having the confidence Athat he will entirely carry out my wishes 
and desires... and knowing that my said friend will, by this 
will, be able much more effectively to dispose of my estate.@ The 
Georgia Supreme Court held that the court must determine whether, 
from the terms employed, an absolute gift was intended or whether 
only legal title was conveyed to enable him to carry out a 
fiduciary duty. It concluded that even though a trust was 
intended to be created, it failed because it was not sufficiently 
declared.42
40 Id. at 1056: AIn order to determine whether the trust 
is a trust this Court will interfere with, it is a matter of 
observation. First, that the words must be imperative, that the 
words are imperative in this case there can be no doubt; 
Secondly, that the subject must be certain, and that brings me to 
the question what is meant by the words Athe property@; and 
Thirdly, that the object must be as certain as the subject, and 
then the question will be, whether the words Amy family@ have as 
much of the quality of certainty, as this species of trust 
requires.@ [emphasis added].
41 29 Ga. 553 (1859)
42 A...[W]ould any Court hold, that the words of this will 
were not imperative ....? Surely not. Chancery would decree, it 
has done often, upon words less mandatory, that there was no 
discretion left to the legatee, but an obligation imposed upon 
his conscience by the will, not inclining him merely, but 
compelling him to execute the testator=s purpose. Such, at any 
rate, is our interpretation of the will.@ The court relied on 
Briggs v. Penny, supra footnote 12. 
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In Board of Foreign Missions of United Presbyterian Church 
v. Culp,43 the Pennsylvania court said:
Where, however, words of recommendation, 
request, and the like are used in direct 
reference to the estate, they are prima facie 
testamentary and imperative, and not 
precatory. Thus, should the testator say 
merely, 'I desire A.B. to have one thousand 
dollars,' it would be as effectual a legacy 
as if he was expressly to direct or will it, 
or were to add 'out of my estate,' or that it 
should be paid by his executor.44
The Eels case45 was cited as authority in McRee=s Adm=rs v. 
Means,46 where a wife gave, devised and bequeathed all her 
property to her husband, Ahis heirs and assigns forever, to his 
use, behoof and benefit, in fee simple; but should my said 
husband die without issue of his body, it is my wish and will he 
shall give all of said property to Robert P. Means.@ Upon her 
husband=s death Aintestate and without issue of his body,@ his 
administrators took possession of the property and Robert P. 
Means brought a Bill in Equity to establish a precatory trust. 
The court said, AWhile the word >will,= per se, has an imperative 
force, we do not doubt that its meaning may be controlled by the 
context...@ yet held that a trust was created for Means= benefit. 
43 Supra, footnote 27.
44 Id. at 118
45 Supra, footnote 28
46 34 Ala. 349 (1859), 1859 WL 745 (Ala.)
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IV TRANSITION
Near the middle of the 19th century, courts in England and 
the United States began to abandon the idea that mere precatory 
words created an imperative interpretation. In its place they 
searched for the real intent of the settlor which was rightfully 
becoming the hallmark in the creation of a trust.
Foundation for the trend was given impetus as early as 1839 
by Lord Langdale in Knight v. Knight47 where he agreed with the 
language of Wright v. Atkyns,48 that precatory language will 
create a trust:
1. If the words are so used that, upon the 
whole, they ought to be construed as 
imperative; 2. If the subject of the 
recommendation or wish be certain; and 3. If 
the objects or persons intended to have the 
benefit of the recommendation or wish be also 
certain.
However, Lord Langdale did not agree with the result in 
Wright and held a trust was not created. The language, AI trust 
to the liberality of my successors to reward any other of my old 
servants and tenants according to their deserts...@ was not 
sufficiently imperative,49 the subject to be affected and the 
47 3 Beav. 148, 49 Eng. Rept. 58 (1839)
48 Supra, footnote 38.
49 This is in contrast to the words Aabsolute desire@ in 
Cruwyn v. Coleman, supra, footnote 34, which case was cited in 
Knight v. Knight, supra, footnote 46. 
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interests to be enjoyed by the objects were not sufficiently 
defined to create a trust. In modern terms, Lord Langdale would 
be adopting a Aplain meaning@ of the precatory words.
Some 45 years later, Lindley, L.J., expresses his agreement 
in In re Adams and the Kensington Vestry.50 AI am very glad to see 
that the current is changed, and that beneficiaries are not to be 
made trustees unless intended to be so by the testator.@ In the 
same case, Cotton, L.J. states, AI have no hesitation in saying 
myself, that I think some of the older authorities went a great 
deal too far in holding that some particular words appearing in a 
will were sufficient to create a trust... we have to see what is 
their true effect.@
The Ingram case51 that holds precatory words are imperative 
was effectively overruled when, in 1863, Georgia enacted Code '
2299 causing Ingram to fall short of meeting the requirements of 
that section. The Code section read: 
Precatory or recommendatory words will create 
a trust if they are sufficiently imperative 
to show that it is not left discretionary 
with the party to act or not, and if the 
subject matter of the trust is defined with 
sufficient certainty, and if the object is 
also certainly defined, and the mode in which 
the trust is to be executed.52
50 27 Ch.Div. 394 (1884)
51 Supra, footnote 40
52 The current statute, ' 53-12-21(b), is similar: AWords 
otherwise precatory in nature will create a trust only if they 
are sufficiently imperative to show a settlor=s intention to 
16
It is clear that precatory words alone will not now, per se, 
establish a trust in Georgia.
But a trust may still be established there. In 1886, parents 
wanted to make a settlement of all their property to their 
daughter by will of the father to protect the property for the 
daughter=s benefit. The wife was granted permission to execute a 
quit claim deed of real estate to her husband to enable him to 
will it to their daughter. The husband died, his wife having 
predeceased him, without a valid will. The property was taken 
possession of by his administrator and the daughter sued 
contending the transaction between her parents amounted to a 
trust for her and thus she was entitled to possession of the 
property.53 The court held that under the circumstances, a valid 
trust was created. It said:
Whenever a manifest intention is exhibited 
that another person shall have the benefit of 
the property, the grantee shall be declared a 
trustee.54
impose enforceable duties on a trustee, and if all other elements 
of an express trust are present.@
53 McCreary v. Gewinner, 29 S.E. 960 (Ga. 1898)
54 Id. at 963; also at 963: AAnd where a person has used 
language from which it can be gathered that he intended to create 
a trust, and such intention is not negatived by the surrounding 
circumstances, and the settler [sic] had done such things as are 
necessary in equity to bind himself not to recede from that 
intention, and the trust property is of such a nature as to be 
legally capable of being settled, and the object of the trust is 
lawful, and the settler [sic] has complied with the provisions of 
law as to evidence, a good and valid declaration of trust has 
17
This transition is also pointed out in Knox, Exec=r v. Knox, 
et al:55
While, on the one hand, we are inclined not 
to go to the extent of older cases in England 
and in this country, in establishing trusts 
upon the strength of precatory words used by 
a testator in his will, on the other, we are 
not disposed to repudiate the whole doctrine 
of such trusts.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts agreed with the 
transition in Aldrich v. Aldrich,56: AIf an arbitrary rule seems 
to have been laid down at one time in regard to what would 
constitute a precatory trust, there can be no doubt, we think, 
that the tendency of later decisions has been, if not to relax 
the rule thus laid down, at least not to extend it.@ This is
evidenced in Lloyd v. Lloyd57 where that same court, a mere three 
months later, affirmed Aldrich where the devise was to a wife: 
AHaving full faith and confidence in my beloved wife... [to] look 
after the welfare of our children@ and held no precatory trust 
(prima facie) been made.@
55 18 N.W. 155, (Wisc. 1884)
56 51 N.E. 449 (Mass. 1898); see also Pratt v. Trustees of 
Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, 42 A. 51 (Md. 1898): AWhatever 
may have been the results reached in the earlier cases on this 
subject, there is a strong tendency nowadays to restrict the 
doctrine of precatory trusts within more reasonable, and somewhat 
narrower, bounds than formerly....@ In Pratt, the words Amy wish 
and will@ did not give rise to a precatory trust.
57 53 N.E. 148 (Mass. 1899)
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was created.58
And yet in Temple v. Russell,59 the court said, AThe words >It 
is also my will= are more than a mere entreaty or expression of 
desire. They are words of command. They express an imperative 
testamentary design.@ The bequest of real estate Ato hold or 
dispose of as he desires or deems best@ was coupled in the same 
paragraph that it was the testator=s Awill and wish@ that the 
devisee give the property to a charity. The later case of 
O=Reilly v. Irving,60 distinguished Temple because the devise of 
the residue to Mary Irving was in the eleventh paragraph and a 
second devise of the residue - to be effective on her death - was 
in the fourteenth paragraph to a charity. 
Kentucky also expressed its agreement in Igo v. Irvine:61
A... the later English and American cases have departed from the 
58 See also Rector v. Alcorn, 41 So. 370 (Miss. 1906), 
where similar words were in the will of a Mississippi Governor, 
the Supreme Court declaring that no precatory trust was created. 
Cf. Seefried v. Clarke, 74 S.E. 204 (Va. 1912) and Harrison v. 
Harrison, 43 Va. 1, 1845 WL 2887 (Va.), to the contrary. 
59 146 N.E. 679 (Mass. 1925); and in In re Hochbrunn=s 
Estate, 244 P. 698 (Wash. 1926), the court held a trust was 
created where the testator, in one continuous paragraph, devised 
his residuary estate with a Aspecial request@ that the brother 
pay their sister $10,000. A...[T]he courteous language used makes 
it no less imperative....@ The reasoning in Hochbrunn was applied 
in In re Estate of Curry, 988 P2d 505 (Wash.App. 1999) in finding 
the words AI trust@ were imperative. 
60 188 N.E. 253 (Mass. 1933) 
61 70 S.W. 826 (Ky. 1902)
19
doctrine of the early cases, and have inclined toward the 
doctrine giving precatory words and expressions only their 
natural force.@ And in interpreting Missouri law, the 8th Circuit
said: AThe tendency of the modern decisions, both in England and 
in this country, is to restrict the practice which deduces a 
trust from the expression by a testator of a wish, desire, or 
recommendation regarding the disposition of property absolutely 
bequeathed.@62 AThe tendency of modern decisions, however, is not 
to extend the rule of practice which, from words of doubtful 
meaning, deduces or implies a trust.@63
Maine=s Judicial Court64 expressed the transition in this 
manner:
It is said that the leaning of the courts is 
against the implication of a trust from words 
of confidence, that the current of decisions 
is now changed, and that many expressions 
formerly held to be indicative of a trust 
would not now be so held. Pom.Eq.Jur. ' 1015. 
We think this means merely that courts now 
place less reliance than formerly upon the 
precise words used, and more upon the meaning 
of the will or the particular bequest, taken 
as a whole. The intention of the testator must 
be found from the whole will.
Despite this trend, Virginia has held that a bequest of a 
62 Burnes, v. Burnes, 137 F. 781 (8th Cir. 1905)  
63 Bryan v. Milby, 24 A. 333, 334 (Del.Ch. 1891); See also 
St. James Parish v. Bagley, supra, footnote 5.
64 Clifford v. Stewart, 49 A. 52 (Me. 1901)
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wife to her husband Awith one simple request@ created a precatory 
trust,65 yet Michigan held that a bequest Awith the earnest 
request@ that the funds be used for religious works did not.66
In Ryder v. Myers67 the Court said that the early 
construction that if a testator Arecommended,@ entreated,@
Arequested,@ or Awished,@ to dispose of absolutely devised 
property, would be held to be imperative and create a trust. 
However, it modified that stance by also stating that, despite 
that being the rule for more than half a century and cannot be 
questioned, Aan implied trust will not arise unless the person or 
object intended to be benefitted thereby is properly and 
definitely described, and the amount of property to which the 
trust shall attach is sufficiently defined.@ It then held a 
bequest of Aall... my jewelry@ to one Mrs. Blumenthal coupled 
with a Arequest@ to honor requests of family members created a 
precatory trust.
V OTHER ASPECTS
There are other early decisions that decide the issue by 
relying on the rule that once a fee estate is conveyed, later 
language limiting that estate is repugnant and will be ignored. 
65 Seefried v. Clarke, 74 S.E. 204 (Va. 1912)
66 In re Stuart=s Estate: Slingerland v. Cederlund, 264 
N.W. 372 (Mich. 1936)
67 167 A. 22 (N.J.Chanc. 1933)
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In other words, a distinction is drawn between cases where the 
gift is for life only and those in which the gift is absolute, 
with super-added words.68
In Irvine v. Irvine,69 the testator left his wife real estate 
Ato have and to hold the same during her natural life... and at 
her death the said land is to be sold, and the proceeds of that 
sale is to be divided equally among my children living at the 
time of my said wife=s death.@ The court held that the gift was in 
fee and the subsequent words did not take away or diminish the 
fee.70
The result in an earlier Virginia case was the same. While 
the testator devised his wife a life estate, he also gave her the 
right to dispose of it during her life with anything remaining to 
be distributed in various shares and estates to his children and 
grandchildren. The court held no precatory trust was created. AIt 
is enough that the testator places the subject at the disposal of 
his wife... it has been decided that the whole interest and 
68 Williams v. Worthington, 1878 WL 6817 (Md.); see also 
Spears v. Ligon, 1883 WL 9141 (Tex.) where the Texas Supreme 
Court discussed both rules (citing Massachusetts case law) but 
decided the issue on the basis that, under the circumstances, a 
precatory trust was not created. See Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 
supra, footnote 36: AThere can be no trust, over the exercise of 
which this Court will not assume control; for an uncontrollable 
power of disposition would be ownership, and not trust.@
69 136 P. 18 (Or. 1913)
70 In accord, Harkness v. Zelly, 135 A. 347 (N.J.Chanc.
1926). 
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property of the subject vests in her.@71
Reasons for this view are stated in Fullenwider v. Watson.72
... [I]t would be very difficult or impossible to determine 
whether any part of the fund remained undisposed of or not;73 it 
would be contrary to the party=s well being to lead him to spend 
all that was given him and might be at the expense of those for 
whom he was under a moral obligation to make some provision; he 
might be disposed to convert the property and dispose of the 
avails lavishly thus defeating the method of distribution 
directed by the law.
In considering all the surrounding circumstances, courts 
sometimes rely on to whom the precatory words are addressed.74
71 May v. Joynes 1871 WL 4870 (Va.); however see Bohon v. 
Barrett=s Exec=r, 1881 WL 8255 (Ky.), where it is said, A... where 
a testator makes an absolute gift to one person, accompanying it 
with a request to appropriate a particular sum to the use of 
another, that the immediate devisee becomes a mere trustee to the 
extent of such sum .... An absolute gift does not contravene 
either an express or implied trust annexed to the gift.@
72 14 N.E. 571 (Ind. 1887)
73 See Bryan v. Milby, supra, footnote 62, where, in a 
case of first impression, the Delaware court said that A... there 
being no certainty as to the existence of a remainder, that no 
precatory trust arose ....@
74 One California case does not agree: in In re Shirley=s 
Estate, 181 P. 777, 778 (Cal. 1919), the court said: AThe fact 
that the clause here involved is not formally addressed or 
directed to any person as one by whom the bequest should be set 
aside is of no importance. Where words are used which dispose of 
property or impose a condition upon a bequest given elsewhere in 
the will, they need not be addressed to any one. It is enough 
that they show the intent and will of the testatrix regarding the 
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For example, in In re Hood=s Estate,75 the testator devised 
her estate to trustees and Aauthorized and empowered@ them to 
distribute the estate to such charities or individuals as they 
should see fit, while also enumerating her Aexpress desire[s].@
The court held that the precatory words, since they were directed 
to trustees, were mandatory. AThe usual rule is that an 
expression of desire on the part of a testator is a mere request 
when addressed to his devisee but is to be construed as a command 
when addressed to his executor....76 No good reason appears why 
the expression of such a desire should not similarly be construed 
as a command when it is addressed to a trustee, particularly when 
it is expressly set forth as a part of the directions to the 
trustee and as stating one of the purposes of the trust.@77
Penny v. White78 combines precatory words not only to a 
property or legacy. If they do this, the court and the law will 
carry it out by probating the will and distributing the estate as 
is provided therein.@
75 135 P.2d 383 (Cal.App.2d 1943)
76 Citing In re Estate of Lawrence, 108 P.2d 893 (Cal. 
1941); In re Estate of Mallon, 93 P.2d 245 (Cal.App.2d 1939)
77 In re Hood=s Estate at 385, supra, footnote 74; see 
also Baker v. McBride, 111 N.W.2d 407 (Wisc. 1961), where a trust 
was established when the precatory words Amy executor shall pay@
were addressed to the executor who was an unrelated party, an 
attorney and the scrivener of the will: APrecatory words directed 
to an executor indicate a trust while the same words to a devisee 
do not.@
78 Supra, footnote 4
24
spouse but also to the spouse as trustee.  It found the 
surrounding circumstances expressed an intent to create a trust 
where the language used was a Arequest.@ In the course of 
contempt proceedings for failure to comply with an order of child 
support, the court construed the parties= property settlement 
agreement. It provided, inter alia, that the residence be 
conveyed to the wife. It further provided that the husband 
Arequests@ that his equity in the jointly owned residence, $7,000 
at the time of the divorce, upon the sale of the residence, be 
held in trust for their children. The trial court awarded the 
$7,000 to the husband outright. On appeal, the court held the 
precatory word established a trust because the extrinsic evidence 
showed that the husband intended to command his equity be taken 
by the wife as trustee. The wife assumed the equity was for the 
children=s college education and the trust was the device to 
accomplish that purpose; the husband Aunderstood@ that the equity 
would be applied toward child support or Aput in a trust fund for 
the kids.@ Thus testimony from both parties showed that they 
agreed that the husband=s equity would be held by the wife as 
trustee for the children.79
Other courts do not so regard that direction. In Estate of 
79 Bohon v. Barrett=s Exec=r, supra, footnote 70 combines 
precatory words to a brother/executor and finds the bequest was 
to be in trust. A... the slightest wish of the testator should be 
binding upon the conscience of his brother.@ [emphasis added]
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Reynolds,80 the testatrix made a Arequest@ that the Trustee 
distribute any funds remaining after the death of her father to a 
Rev. Armstrong who @shall use the money so received by him in the 
promotion and furtherance of his Radio Ministry and the spreading 
of the Gospel as he may see fit....@ The court said, AA testator=s 
use of the word >request= does not necessarily create a precatory 
trust, and it never does unless in other parts of the will a 
plain intention appears to create a trust.@ Since the language of 
the will allowed him to either apply the funds for religious 
purposes or keep it for his own benefit, no trust was created. He 
was free Ato do as he liked with the property.@81 In this case the 
Trustee was an unrelated party who was an attorney.82
That the testator Arecommends@ the devisee to will the 
property to certain persons at her death fares no better. In 
Goslee=s Adm=r v. Goslee=s Exec=r,83 the husband Arecommended@ to the 
wife certain persons as proper ones to inherit should she die 
intestate. The court held that no precatory trust was created and 
that the wife took the estate in fee simple.
80 800 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.App.E.D., 1990)
81 Id., at 800
82 See also Norris v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
134 F.2d 796 (7th Cir., 1943) where individual trustees (one the 
testatrix=s son) were Aauthorized and empowered@ not only to name 
charities as legatees but to determine the amount of the gift. 
The court held no trust was created.   
83 94 S.W. 638 (Ky.App. 1906)
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And in Murphy v. Carlin,84 the Testator provided that it was 
his Awish and desire that my wife85 continue to provide for care 
comfort, and education@ of the five year old whom they took into 
their family when he was orphaned and raised as their own. After 
stating that precatory words will impose a binding duty upon the 
devisee, by way of trust, provided there is certainty as to 
subject matter and object of the trust (which were sufficiently 
and clearly pointed out in this case), it said A... it is to be 
remembered that the devisee is the wife of the testator, between 
whom it is not expected that commands would be expressed in such 
forcible language as between strangers.@86
In a later Nebraska case, Page v. Buchfinck,87 a bequest to 
the testator=s wife Aupon the hope, desire and belief@ she would 
leave her property to their children did not create a trust by 
precatory words, finding that the choice of words only Aindicates 
a suggestion of a result he would like to see accomplished.@
The same mandatory interpretation does not prevail where the 
84 20 S.W. 786 (Mo. 1892); see also Major v. Herndon, 1879 
WL 6692 (Ky.)
85
who was not also named as a trustee
86 Id. at 787; cf: Thompson v. Smith, 300 S.W.2d 404 
(Mo.1957) where Awish@ was held insufficient to create a 
precatory trust. In Hayes v. Hayes, 145 S.W. 1155 (Mo. 1912), the 
Missouri Supreme Court said A...the law does not undertake to 
enforce duties of imperfect obligation. These rest in foro 
conscientiae.@
87 275 N.W.2d 826 (Nebr. 1979)
27
words are directed to a devisee who is a relative other than a 
spouse. In Morris v. Morris,88 the precatory words, Aher wish that 
the property would be used@ for children, were directed to a 
relative, the court holding that a trust was not established.89
And even where the words were directed to a son, also an 
executor, a Arequest that my Executors see that [a granddaughter] 
is given sufficient funds to complete her education@ did not 
create a trust.90
This is also the case when the words are directed to 
siblings. In Sanger v. Sanger,91 testator provides, AIn the event 
I own a home as of the date of my death, it is my wish that if 
any child of mine wishes to reside in such home he or she shall 
be allowed to by my other children.@ No trust arose. And see In 
re Campbell92 that lists cases where Awish@ is held to create a 
trust and cases where it does not and also stating that, 
AGenerally speaking, a wish is a wish, and nothing more, unless 
the testator used it in such a way as to indicate a different 
88 327 N.E.2d 917 (Mass.App. 1975)
89 Decedent=s father=s testamentary Awish@ that his stocks 
be placed in trust was insufficient to create a precatory trust 
under Missouri law. Centerre Trust Co. of St. Louis, v. The 
United States of America, 676 F. Supp. 928 (D.C.E.D. Mo., 1988)  
90 Pittman v. Thomas, 299 S.E.2d 207 (N.C. 1983) 
91 673 N.W.2d 411 (Wisc.App. 2003) 
92 229 N.W. 247 (Iowa 1930)
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intention.@93
Also compare Magnus v. Magnus,94 where the disposition was to 
a niece Ato dispose of in accordance with my instructions to 
her,@ the court finding a trust had been created and Newhall v. 
McGill,95 where the disposition was for the property to be 
Adisposed of according to my personal directions,@ the court 
finding a trust was not created.
In a curious decision, a Georgia court held that where a 
wife devised her home to her mother for life with remainder to 
her son, but that Ait is my wish@ her husband be permitted to 
reside in the residence for his life, the will did not create a 
precatory trust but created a joint life estate between the 
parties.96
The difficulty courts have in determining the settlor=s 
intent when precatory words are used is illustrated by two cases 
decided by the Supreme Court of Washington. In Woodcock v. 
McCord,97 the testator gave the residue of his estate to trustees 
and Asuggested@ that they sell his sawmill plant to a corporation 
to be organized by his employees, also suggesting that all 
93 Id. 248
94 84 A. 705 (N.J.Chanc. 1912); in this case, however, the 
trust failed for uncertainty as to the objects to be benefitted.
95 212 P.2d 764 (Ariz. 1949)
96 Marshall v. Cozart, 95 S.E.2d 729 (Ga. 1956)
97 295 P. 734 (Wash. 1931)
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employees who have been employed for five years or longer should 
hold stock in the new corporation. The trustees had not sold the 
sawmill to the employee=s corporation and three of its 
incorporators sued. The trial court sustained the trustees=
demurrer and the incorporators appealed. In a 5-4 decision, the 
court held that the will created a precatory trust that the 
complaint was sufficient as against the general demurrer, and 
remanded the case for the trustees to submit a plan to carry out 
the intent of the testator, i.e., that the Asuggestion@ created a 
mandatory duty upon the trustees to sell the sawmill, but leaving 
discretion to the trustees the details of the transfer.98 The case 
came to the court again. The court held, 6-3, no trust was 
created: AIn the case at bar, there was no imperative duty upon 
the trustees to sell the stock of merchandise, mill, and mill 
plant to a corporation to be organized by decedent=s employees.@99
It further held that the will bestowed upon the trustees a 
complete discretionary power to convey or not to convey and that 
the class of persons referred to as employees of decedent was 
indefinite. In deciding the latter issue, it stated it had not 
been decided in the case below and based its decision on Morice 
98 See 7 Washington L. Rev. 296 at 299
99 10 P.2d 219 (1932) at 223; only one judge had been 
replaced (with the writer of the new majority opinion), but four 
judges changed their minds, three of the opinion that the words 
did not create a trust, one deciding a trust was created. 
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v. Bishop of Durham.100
VI Negative Precatory Words
Would it be useful for the settlor to express his intent not 
to create a trust? He could provide that AThe precatory words 
used are not intended to create any obligation on the part of the 
trustee/executor/devisee and are not to be considered mandatory.@
This language could go a long way to avoid litigation. 
For example, in Cooke v. King,101 the testators executed a 
mutual will devising their property to the husband=s brother Awith 
the hope@ he would dispose of the property in accordance with the 
testators= wishes known to him. The will went further to express 
their intent not to impose any obligation Ato carry out any such 
personal wishes or desires@ but having confidence that their 
wishes will be carried out so far as practicable. The court, in 
holding no trust was created, said: AThe great weight of 
authority is to the effect that where the testator uses words 
disclaiming an intention to create a trust, no trust will be 
implied from the inclusion of precatory or recommendatory 
language.@102
On the other hand, such a statement may not be sufficient. 
In Bohon v. Barrett=s Exec=r,103 a precatory trust was established 
100 Supra, footnote 8.
101 Cooke v. King, 61 P.2d 429 (Or. 1936)
102 Id. at 434
103 Supra, footnote 70.
31
despite the following language: A... these requests are not to be 
legally binding upon [the executor], but I desire to leave the 
same entirely to his discretion, and to make no requirement of 
him that would be legally binding upon him in a court of equity 
or elsewhereBit being my wish to leave the whole matter to his 
sense of right and discretion....@
VII CONCLUSION
Courts104 continue to remind us that an implied (precatory) 
trust will be created: 
1. If the words are so used that, upon the 
whole, they ought to be construed as 
imperative; 2. If the subject of the 
recommendation or wish be certain; and 3. If 
the objects or persons intended to have the 
benefit of the recommendation or wish be also 
certain.105
It is the first factor that has been redefined over the 
centuries - from mandatory, per se, to the modern trend of 
determining the settlor=s intention based on all the facts and 
circumstances. The cases illustrate the complexities of 
determining the settlor=s intent when precatory expressions are 
used. 
104 Lines v.Darden, 5 Fla. 51 (1853); and scholars: Bogert, 
The Law of Trusts and Trustees, ' 1, Rev. 2nd Ed. (1984).
105 Knight v. Knight, supra, footnote 46; Magnant v. 
Peacock, 25 So.2d 566 (FL. 1946); see also William H. Namack, 
III, Administration of Trusts in Florida, Chapter 2, p. 53, The 
Florida Bar, 2001.
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In the early years, the courts were not interpreting intent 
in accordance with its Aplain language@ and gave the precatory 
words mandatory meaning. It would clearly not be appropriate to 
go in the opposite direction by always giving precatory words 
their plain meaning. After all, the settlor=s intent is the 
hallmark of a trust.
With the mantra that courts consider all the surrounding 
circumstances,106 there is no reason to believe there will or 
should be a bright line test emerging at any future time.107 The 
point was succinctly put as early as 1851 by Vice-Chancellor 
Cranworth in Williams v. Williams:108 AI doubt if there can exist 
any formula for bringing to a direct test the question whether 
the words of request, or hope, or recommendation are or are not 
to be construed as obligatory.@
106 Scott, The Law of Trusts ' 25.2 (4th Ed., 1987): AIn 
each case, in reaching its determination the court will examine 
the whole of the will and examine it in light of all the 
circumstances.@
107 In the twenty-seven states where holographic wills are 
valid, issues concerning precatory words and expressions are 
bound to continue. The states that allow holographic wills are: 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Such wills are permitted 
for soldiers and sailors in Maryland and New York. Wills, Trusts, 
and Estates, Dukeminier, Johanson, Lindgren & Sitkoff, 7th
Edition, Aspen Publishers, 2005, p. 263. 
108 1 Sim. (N.S.) 358, 369, 61 Eng. Rept. 139, 143 (1851)
